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And when each day's 'reality' is 'dramatically' put 
together for us by enterprises that comb the entire world 
for calamities, conflicts, and dire forebodings, such a 
documentary replica of the arena confuses us as to the 
actual recipe of motives on which the world is 
operating.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The mass media of communication have been criticized for all things 
by all people. In particular, they have been accused of causing violent 
behavior in viewers—particularly terrorists. Many who make this 
criticism do so with the goal of advocating censorship. The desire to ex-
amine the efficacy of censorship as a solution motivates this paper. 
This paper challenges the idea that the media "cause" or strongly 
motivate acts of terrorism. The suggestion of such a causal relationship 
apparently is made sincerely by government officials, media critics, and 
the public at large. In a poll of police chiefs of large American cities, 
93% said they "believed live tv coverage of terrorist acts encourage ter-
rorism [sic]," and 87% of the police chiefs favored limiting or 
eliminating coverage of terrorism.2 These beliefs underwrite both the 
prevalence of this perception in government circles and the correlation 
between belief in a causal relationship and support of limitations on 
media coverage of terrorism. 
Local officials are not alone in these beliefs. Former Undersecretary 
of State Lawrence Eagleburger has said, "television simply has to come 
to grips with the fact that these terrorists do what they do, at least in 
part, because of the publicity" the media provide.3 Henry Kissinger has 
suggested that "what the media ought to consider is not to carry 
anything including the terrorists."4 
Media critics of every stripe have criticized television in particular 
for its coverage of terrorism. The Columbia Journalism Review reported 
that "the most vigorous criticism of the networks was . . . that they 
played into the hands of the terrorists by giving them a forum for their 
views and demands."5 Michael Novak complained that "television got 
out the story the terrorists wanted out."6 Jonathan Alter questioned 
whether coverage of the hijacking of TWA flight 847 was "prolonging 
the ordeal by in effect handing the terrorist a megaphone," so the ter-
rorists "got exactly what they wanted out of the news media: a conduit 
for their demands."7 John Lofton believes "the networks allowed 




Public denunciations of media coverage of terrorism are common. 
Letters-to-the-editor and public opinion polls reveal a widespread opi-
nion that coverage causes terrorism and ought to be curtailed, either 
voluntarily or by statute. This is not limited to the United States. A 
French poll found that 55% of those polled wanted the French media to 
speak "as little as possible" about French hostages being held in Libya 
"in order not to give publicity to the hostage-takers."9 George Gerbner 
reports that after a political kidnapping 8 out of 10 Germans favored an 
embargo on news coverage.10 
In light of these frequent calls for censorship as a panacea for ter-
rorist violence, the underlying assumption that terrorism is caused by 
desire for media coverage bears close scrutiny before remedial action is 
taken. It is not necessary to prove that terrorists do not want media 
coverage in order to show that censorship is ineffective. Rather, one need 
only prove the existence of another motivation sufficient for committing 
these actions. This paper uses Kenneth Burke's dramatistic approach to 
communication to examine whether terrorism might be motivated/ 
"caused" by motives more basic than desire for media coverage. 
The paper does not assert that terrorists do not enjoy coverage and 
respond to it. Rather, it argues that terrorism would occur because of its 
symbolic value even if no media coverage resulted, and that popular 
demands for media restraint or censorship are misplaced. In making 
these arguments it is essential to provide some qualifiers. First, there is 
no claim to universal application. When terrorism passes into insurgen-
cy—that is, when terrorists find themselves capable of holding enemy 
territory and hence having traditional tactical and strategic objectives, 
the Burkean analysis may be less useful because communications to par-
ties outside the inner circle of terrorists may serve instrumental objec-
tives, while Burke's analysis is primarily of the consummatory functions 
of symbolic activity. Second, the study is limited to non-state terrorist 
groups operating for political purposes. It does not include state actors, 
the mentally ill, or the criminal performing terrorist acts for profit." 
Terrorism as human social action 
Communication theorist Kenneth Burke's theory of social action is 
part of the "new rhetoric." The "old" rhetoric was the study of persua-
sion, tended to be atheoretical, and provided systems that could be 
taught easily. Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in 
any given case the available means of persuasion."12 To the ancient 
Greeks in their burgeoning "democracy," the art of persuasion was an 
important one that had to be taught quickly to a large number of men. 
Hence, the early study of rhetoric was pedagogically rather than 
theoretically oriented and might be called grammatical. The "new 
rhetoric" is intensely theoretical, uninterested in oratorical pedagogy, 
and "may best be described as 'social' or 'sociological.' "13 
The new rhetoric is important because it is inextricably tied to the 
principles and practices by which human societies are organized— 
hierarchy.14 The new rhetoric is interested in how people relate to one 
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another in society through the use of symbols. Speech communication 
theorists Frank E.X. Dance and Carl E. Larson have noted that "human 
communication links people with other people. It is the process through 
which social bonds are established and maintained, human relationships 
are defined, and almost all forms of social behavior are manifested."" 
The study of such pervasive and powerful phenomena is what leads to 
the definition of rhetoric as the study of "the uniquely human ability to 
use symbols to communicate with one another."16 
Analysis of terrrorism should begin with an understanding that it is 
human action. Action is distinct from motion because humans can act, 
while things can but move. This realization forces us to examine the en-
tire complex of motives that surround human action because of its sym-
bolic nature. This realization is central to Burke's theories of human 
social action.17 Burke says that human action differs from motion in 
kind because humans are "symbol-using animal[s]," homo symbolicum, 
and because the use of symbols for identification and communication 
makes human action unique. 
Because humans act, Burke's dramatistic approach is not a 
metaphor, it literally depicts human life. Burke's dramatism is a method 
for analyzing human relations and motives in acting. By analyzing 
human actions—including symbolic actions—we may understand how 
humans relate to one another and why they act as they do.18 
Hugh Dalziel Duncan, a sociologist disciple of Burke, has applied 
dramatism to the analysis of the formation and operation of human 
society. The most basic proposition of Duncan's view of society is that 
"society arises in, and continues to exist through, the communication of 
significant symbols."19 Humankind forms societies as a means of resolv-
ing the conflict between individuals' physical estrangement from one 
another and their innate desire to bridge this estrangement by becoming 
"consubstantial" with and by "identifying" with others. 
The formation of societies produces social orders "expressed 
through hierarchies which differentiate men into ranks, classes, and 
status groups."20 These hierarchies relate people as equals, superiors, 
and inferiors and are supported by "principles of order . . . believed 
'necessary' to social integration."21 The principles upon which the 
hierarchy is based are necessary in convincing people to accept their 
assigned roles in society—an exercise in persuasion. However, these prin-
ciples contain the seeds of their own destruction. Principles of order give 
rise to commandments—the "thou-shalt-nots" which dictate ap-
propriate and inappropriate behavior. The existence of commandments 
and the human inability to obey commandments produces a cycle: 
In sum: 
In the Iron Law of History 
That welds Order and Sacrifice: 
Order leads to Guilt 
(for who can keep commandments) 
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Guilt needs Redemption 
(for who would not be cleansed) 
Redemption needs Redeemer 




(hence: Cult of the Kill).22 
Order is a motive for human behavior arising from individuals' 
"need to find a place" in the world. Order is hierarchial because it iden-
tifies these places and their relationships to one another.23 A hierarchy 
must persuade those living under it in order to command them how to 
live. But, since people cannot always obey commandments, guilt arises. 
Guilt is individuals' realization that they have violated the "sacred" 
principles necessary to the society which has given them order and a sense 
of place. 
Guilt becomes a motive as persons seek redemption for their guilt. 
Redemption, however, requires the sacrifice of a victim. Expiating guilt 
by doing harm to self Burke calls mortification. Sacrificing of a 
scapegoat other Burke calls victimage. Burke has noted that "the pro-
moting of social cohesion through victimage is 'nornal' and 'natural' " 
and not restricted to ancient or primitive societies.24 The use of 
scapegoats has the "ability to establish social cohesion and . . . con-
substantial identification." Hence, "victimage can be viewed . . . as a 
means of establishing order because it serves to unite a society against a 
common enemy."25 
Victimage, then, is essential for producing, for the individual suffer-
ing from guilt, "redemption, rebirth, or a new identity." According to 
Foss, Foss and Trapp, 
The rhetoric of rebirth . . . involves movement through 
three steps—pollution, purification, and redemption. 
Pollution is the initial state of guilt, an unclean con-
dition of sins and burdens; purification is the step 
of cleansing or catharsis, where the guilt is sloughed 
off; and redemption is the stage of cleanliness in which 
a new state—whether physical, spiritual, or 
psychological—is achieved.26 
Rhetorical theorists Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith have 
noted that, to achieve purification, radicals may "work out the rite of 
the kill symbolically. Harassing, embarrassing, disarming the enemy may 
suffice, especially if he is finally led to admit his impotence in the face of 
the superior will of the revolutionary." Thus victimage provides rebirth 
for radicals. "By the act of overcoming his enemy, he who supplants 
demonstrates his own worthiness, effacing the mark, whatever it may 
be—immaturity, weakness, subhumanity—that his enemy has set upon 
his brow."27 
Radicals and terrorists are parts of societies—rebel societies with 
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their own symbols, hierarchies, sacred principles, and need for redemp-
tion from guilt caused by violating these principles. Hence, Burke's 
analysis of society can be applied to-terrorist societies to explain the 
primary reasons terrorists commit violent deeds.28 
Terrorist violence as social action 
Societies exist in a state of flux because "social order is always a 
resolution of acceptance, doubt, or rejection of the principles that are 
believed to guarantee such order."2' Society must provide us with 
"means to expiate guilt arising from disobedience," for "no society can 
survive unless symbolic resources are available for expiating guilt arising 
out of failures . . . to uphold principles of hierarchy believed necessary 
to survival of the group."30 When people begin to doubt too much the 
reigning principles of order, "victimage passes into result." Even socie-
ty's use of force "must rest on belief. The victim must believe in his guilt 
and in the right of his executioners to punish him . . . . The revolu-
tionary is an enemy, not a victim."31 
Revolutionaries and terrorists, then, are people who can no longer 
expiate their guilt under the reigning symbols of social order. They form 
their own societies that allow expiation. "One notable characteristic of 
the rhetoric of the first stage of a revolution stems from the revolu-
tionary's need for identification because in the process of divorcing 
himself from the images of the past, he welcomes new symbols to restore 
his security."32 
Seen this way, terrorism and revolution are not aberrations, but 
simply another ordering of human society. Terror and revolution are on-
ly aberrations by the standards provided by the principles upon which 
mainstream society is built. Viewed as a species of human social action, 
terrorism and revolution become understandable. 
The violent deeds of terrorists are committed to provide the new 
social order they seek. Burke provides this illustration: 
With the evidence of the Crucifixion before us, we can-
not deny that consubstantiality is established by com-
mon involvement in a killing. But one must not isolate 
the killing itself as the essence of the exaltation. Rather, 
one can account for the consubstantiality as arising 
from common participation in a notable, or solemn ex-
perience. Thus, we once saw the history of a human 
society in miniature, grounded in a rhetoric of primitive 
magic. Some boys, about ten years of age, had been 
playing in a vacant lot. They stirred up a rattlesnake, 
which the father of one boy killed with a hoe. They had 
their pictures taken, dangling the dead snake. Im-
mediately after, they organized the Rattlesnake Club. 
Their members were made consubstantial by the 
sacrifice of this victim, representing dangers and trium-
phs they had shared in common. The snake was a sacred 
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offering; by its death it provided the spirit for this 
magically united band.33 
The killing and maiming done by terrorists, and the risks they take 
together are violent and dramatic attempts to form and maintain their 
new society by proving their own worth in accordance with their own 
principles of order. The victimization of members of mainstream society 
purifies terrorists of guilt. Duncan argues, "For it is only by acting 
together under great community symbols that men identify and thus rid 
themselves of loneliness and despair. Men need each other in hate as well 
as love . . . Men do not want to communicate about love and hate, but 
to express them in community with other men."34 
Because "social relations are dramatic relations . . . men seek socie-
ty, brotherhood, and love." But, they do so "through community 
dramas of guilt, redemption, victimage, and hierarchy." These dramas 
often involve the symbolic or actual killing of a scapegoat whose killing 
purifies those involved in the drama. In explaining war as a normal part 
of mainstream society, Duncan wrote, 
All wars are conducted as "holy" wars. The enemy 
must be defeated not only to gain . . . any of the alleged 
"rational" reasons for war, but because his defeat and 
punishment will relieve us of our guilt and fear . . . as 
we wound and kill . . . our love for each other 
deepens . . . our hatred of each other is being purged.35 
Because "victimage is the basic form of expiation in the com-
munication of social order," we should not be surprised to see terrorist 
societies using victimage to accomplish this purpose.36 The seemingly 
senseless killings done by terrorists serve the same function for terrorist 
society that wars and punishment of criminals and dissidents perform for 
mainstream society. The repulsive form of victimage taken by terrorists 
is only repulsive from the perspective of our society's principles of order. 
Mainstream societies are not immune from such rituals, as Duncan has 
observed: 
This model of victimage is familiar in our time. We turn 
in horror from Stalin's purges and Hitler's death camps, 
but we face the terrible revelation that victimage works. 
Man is a social beast of prey. He does not kill for food, 
but to achieve "order" in society. Thus before we create 
models of social order which tell us what happens after 
or before conflict, . . . we must develop models which 
tell us something about what goes on during conflict.37 
Terrorists sometimes seem conscious of their participation in the 
creation and maintenance of a new social order. Menahem Begin has 
written about the use of victimage by the Irgun to remove the negative 
labels put on them by their enemies, hence allowing for rebirth. "The 
'smear' with which our enemies and opponents tried to belittle us was to 
us a source of pride. People who had been humiliated and degraded 
became proud fighters in our ranks, free and equal men and women."38 
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An anonymous writer for the Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction wrote 
that becoming an urban guerrilla, "Presupposes that one is . . . sure 
that the whole anti-Semite-criminal-subhuman-murderer-arsonist syn-
drome they use against revolutionaries, all that shit that they alone are 
able to abstract and articulate and that still influences some comrades' 
attitude to us, that none of this has any effect on us."39 
Begin also wrote of the "order" of Irgun society, writing that "a 
fighting underground is a vertitable state in miniature: a state at war. It 
has its army, its police, its own courts. It has at its disposal all the ex-
ecutive arms of a state." Begin also described the Irgun as a society 
operating under new symbols of order. 
In the Shock Units and in all the divisions of the Irgun 
we had members who came from all Jewish com-
munities and of all classes. We had people from Tunis 
and Harbin, Poland and Persia, France and Yemen, 
Belgium and Iraq, Czechoslovakia and Syria; we had 
natives of the United States and Bokhara, of England, 
Scotland, Argentina and South Africa, and most of all, 
of Eretz Israel itself. We were the melting-pot of the 
Jewish nation in miniature. We never asked about 
origins: we demanded only loyalty and ability. Our 
comrades from the eastern communities felt happy and 
at home in the Irgun. Nobody ever displayed any stupid 
airs of superiority toward them; and they were thus 
helped to free themselves of any unjustified sense of in-
feriority they may have harbored. They were fighting 
comrades and that was enough. They could, and did, at-
tain the highest positions of responsibility.40 
As opposed to the unity and society found within terrorist society, 
the enemy is to be regarded as less than human and deserving of death. 
The killing of others who are like us is never as easy as killing others who 
are identifiably "them," and not "us." For, as Rand Corporation 
analyst Brian Jenkins has observed, "As we have seen throughout 
history, the presumed approval of God for the killing of pagans, 
heathens, or infidels can permit acts of great destruction and self-
destruction."'" 
The killing of innocents outside terrorist societies is but one form of 
victimage available to terrorists. By risking their own lives in all-out arm-
ed confrontations with authorities, terrorists also can practice mortifica-
tion. As Duncan notes, when "we cannot find easy outgoing relief or 
cannot project our guilt upon another, we circle back upon ourselves."42 
Terrorists can punish themselves to expiate guilt, but this punishment 
must be done on the terms of the terrorists' social order. Hence, mor-
tification may take the form of foolhardy risk-taking in a violent en-
counter with authorities, or the martyrdom of a suicide mission. 
Terrorists sometimes seem aware of the dramatic nature of their ac-
tivities. Yehoshafat Harkabi notes AIFatah's belief that "Violence has a 
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therapeutic effect, purifying society of its diseases." Al Fatah believes 
"violence will purify the individuals from venom, it will redeem the col-
onized from inferiority complex, it will return courage to the coun-
tryman." This statement is more than just the stretching of a metaphor 
to the extreme. Given Burke's framework and the appeal of this kind of 
rhetoric to terrorists, it is possible to explain why it works and why ter-
rorists practice violence. Speaking further of the redemption and 
purification provided by violence, Al Fatah stated in regard to Israel 
"Blazing our armed revolution inside the occupied territory is a healing 
medicine for all our people's diseases."43 
Hardman has noted that terrorists inevitably challenge the sacred 
nature of the existing social order as a prelude to establishing a new one. 
They do so by showing that the existing social order does not respect 
sacred principles. Terrorism seeks to portray the "existing government as 
a usurper of the people's power or of the historic rights of a certain 
dynasty or class."44 
In the most extreme case, terrorists might construct a new social 
order around perpetual violence. Such a society would have principles of 
order alien to any existing society and these principles might require 
perpetual violence—both victimage and mortification—in order for guilt 
to be avoided and redeemed. This is the kind of social order found in 
Miller's description of the renowned terrorist, Abu Nidal. 
In following Abu Nidal's trail over the past decade, one 
fact is unmistakable. The violence and terror he sows is 
not directed at any achievable political goal. While Abu 
Nidal pursues tactical ends—publicity, intimida-
tion—he does not seek to use terror to achieve Palesti-
nian rights or a state in his lifetime or even in that of his 
children. For him the struggle against Zionism and all of 
its supporters is timeless and continues without regard 
for accommodation, compromise, or negotiation. "The 
fact that the Zionists have taken my Arab homeland is 
for me more than a crime," Abu Nidal asserted last fall. 
"For me it would be a crime if we permitted the Zionist 
to leave our homeland alive." It is here, in a world of 
grievances that can never be addressed, of injustices that 
can never be righted and of unending vengeance that 
Abu Nidal operates—impervious and opposed to all 
forms of accommodation of moderation.45 
The leaders of dominant social orders do not doubt that terrorism is 
an attack on social order. Though not a physical threat, because most 
terrorists are too weak and unpopular to be a threat, terrorists pose a 
rhetorical threat—they present an alternative. Government leaders often 
respond to terrorism in just the way Burke would predict—by gathering 
together the most powerful symbols and sacred principles of social order 
to refute the terrorists. 
U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz used sacred U.S. principles 
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including "rule of law," "morality," "courage," "democracy," "self-
confidence," "individual rights," and "freedom" in an essay on ter-
rorism. Terrorists must be victimized to redeem the guilt that arises when 
terrorism is allowed to disrupt or threaten the peace and tranquility pro-
mised by the existing social order. Schultz assured readers that "our ac-
tions will be governed by the rule of law." But, "if terrorism is truly a 
threat to Western moral values, our morality must not paralyze 
us . . . and if the enemies of these values are united, so too must the 
democratic countries be united in defending them." Schultz went on, "if 
we truly believe in the values of our civilization, we have a duty to defend 
them. The democracies must have the self-confidence to tackle this 
menacing problem . . . We must confront the terrorist threat with the 
same resolve and determination that this nation has shown time and 
again." While fighting the battle against terrorism might get messy, "we 
must always keep in mind the values and way of life we are trying to pro-
tect. Clearly, we will not allow ourselves to descend to the level of bar-
barism that terrorism represents."46 
The role of the media in terrorist violence 
These motives for terrorist violence do not leave much of a role for 
the media in "causing" terrorist violence. The terrorist is a social 
creature seeking his/her own satisfying social symbols, purifying his/her 
guilt, and removing unsatisfactory identifications put on him/her by the 
enemy society by striking out at that society. By "killing" the 
enemy—physically or symbolically—terrorists are enacting "social 
dramas . . . whose proper enactment is believed necessary to community 
survival."47 
These purposes are served for terrorists by participation in, not by 
media coverage of, the rituals. The audience reached by this kind of 
ritual drama is composed of those who already have rejected the reigning 
symbols of order and who are part of radical/terrorist society. This is not 
a major segment of the audience attending to Western mass media chan-
nels. Rather, these are the "insiders"—people already committed to the 
cause.48 "Insiders" share in the rituals by word of mouth and by prior 
rehearsal with participants—they do not need media channels. 
Ultimately, then, terrorism more nearly "causes" media coverage 
than the reverse. Violent terrorism is merely another form for expressing 
the victimage and mortification expressed in any society. Hence ter-
rorism is "caused" by the nature of humanity as homo symbolicum, and 
media coverage results because the dramatic nature of the events is con-
sistent with news organizations' standards of news worthiness.4' 
This does not mean that terrorists do not derive satisfaction from 
manipulating the media or from their sudden fame. Rather, these are 
serendipitous benefits to actions taken as the result of the most powerful 
motives known to humanity—the motives Burke calls "Order" and 
"Kill."50 The power of these motives arises from their elemental nature. 
The need for order necessitates victimage/mortification, and this 
motivates terrorism. Burke's explanation is more elegant than the 
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popular causal view of the terrorism-media relationship, which requires a 
number of questionable assumptions be made about terrorists or the im-
pact of mediated violence and persuasive messages. Further, this ap-
proach provides a clear statement of the motives driving terrorism and 
offers the hope of remedial action. For, if terrorism is an expressive act, 
its solution may lie in finding alternative means of expression. 
Media criticism as social action 
The barrage of criticism aimed at media coverage of terrorism is in-
explicable in the absence of evidence that coverage causes terrorism or 
helps terrorists. However, if we look at such criticism as social acts of 
victimage and/or mortification, it becomes explicable as its primary 
motivation is revealed. 
The news media are part of the larger society, but each journalistic 
organization is a miniature society within a society. The community of 
journalists is a society within the larger society just as newspaper 
reporters are a society within the community of journalists and the staff 
of a single newspaper is a society within the society of newspaper 
reporters. 
Humans' inability to keep commandments partly results from the 
fact that the commandments operating in a society conflict with one 
another, particularly as persons belong to smaller societies within the 
larger society. For example, one commandment of society is that the 
families of the recently deceased should not be intruded upon. But this 
conflicts with the commandment that a newsperson always gets the story 
no matter what the cost. Another commandment of society is that 
criminals and lunatics should not be given access to the coveted airwaves 
or front pages—these are the domain of government leaders and 
prestigious persons. But this conflicts with the standards of newswor-
thiness that journalists use in selecting and presenting news (a U.S. televi-
sion network's recent secret interview with Abu Nidal, for example, led 
to a great furor when the network refused to disclose his whereabouts to 
government authorities). 
When such conflicts arise, leaders assigned by society will defend 
and uphold the principles in conflict by victimizing the journalists for 
their coverage through name-calling, threats of legislative changes, and 
otherwise disciplining them. 
Within the "community of journalists" a great deal of mortification 
is going on in the form of public breast-beatings over the nature, extent, 
and form of media news coverage of terrorism. The television networks 
produce specials debating their own coverage, newspapers attack televi-
sion reporters' excesses, and public television holds round-table discus-
sions of the excesses of its commercial counterparts. 
All of this criticism comes about because the behavior of jour-
nalists—while consistent with the principles of order under which jour-
nalism is conducted—violates sacred principles deemed essential to the 
survival of the greater society which surrounds them. A dramatistic 
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analysis of this endless self-criticism and external media criticism would 
appear to be warranted at this time.51 
The promise of this line of research is that it explains the prevalence 
of media-bashing despite the absence of evidence that media coverage 
does any good for terrorists or harm to society. The media are scapegoats 
for the existing social order's inability to keep the peace—a very impor-
tant symbol of the social order. The media are also the victims of the 
need for mortification and victimage which arises from the conflicting 
commandments governing the larger society and its parts. Finally, the 
media serve as scapegoats for the guilt the audience feels for attending to 
media that have violated important commandments of the social order. 
Conclusions 
Terrorism is not a unique form of behavior. Rather, it is a species of 
the genus of human social action and explicable as such. We can predict 
terrorism to the extent that when people reject an existing social order to 
establish one that replaces the existing symbols and order, we know that 
they will be motivated to engage in victimage and mortification of the 
sort found in terrorism. And, we know that this motivation—which may 
be enhanced by the desire for media coverage—exists independently of 
any such coverage. 
Many states are unable to control terrorism now, but knowledge of 
the purposes it serves provides hope that governments might learn to 
avoid the estrangements that necessitate this violence. For example, if 
victimage is necessitated to remove the negative labels put on terrorists 
by mainstream society, then a palliative might be to encourage 
authorities to reduce the intensity and frequency of their labeling of 
groups outside the mainstream of society. In such denunciations, the 
symbols that tie society together begin to function at the same time to ex-
aggerate its differences and to reduce the chances that divisions can be 
resolved peacefully. Perhaps in the future the authorities can help ter-
rorists find alternative, peaceful means to achieve the purification and 
redemption they so badly need, and which they currently find in violent 
bloody sacrifices. 
Finally, there is now evidence to respond to those who advocate cen-
sorship of media journalism on the basis of the argument that media 
coverage is one of the primary motives for terrorist violence. 
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